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Local leaders possess significant and growing authority over
refugee resettlement, yet we know little about their attitudes toward
refugees. In this article, we use a conjoint experiment to evaluate
how the attributes of hypothetical refugee groups influence local pol-
icymaker receptivity toward refugee resettlement. We sample from
a novel, national panel of current local elected officials, who repre-
sent a broad range of urban and rural communities across the United
States. We find that many local officials favor refugee resettlement
regardless of refugee attributes. However, officials are most recep-
tive to refugees whom they perceive as a strong economic and social
fit within their communities. Our study is the first in a growing litera-
ture on individual attitudes toward refugees to systematically exam-
ine the preferences of US local elected officials, and offers unique
















What factors lead local elected officials to support refugee2
resettlement in their communities? Local leaders’ attitudes3
toward refugees significantly influence refugee resettlement4
outcomes. Sympathetic local elites can facilitate the social5
and economic transition for resettled refugees by easing access6
to social services and economic assistance. By contrast, less7
receptive local officials can impose hostile regulations or incite8
resident resentment (1, 2). Since newly settled refugees often9
rely on community assistance, these obstacles represent real10
barriers for successful resettlement.11
Recent executive actions have expanded US local elected of-12
ficials’ already-critical role in the refugee resettlement process.13
In September 2019, President Donald Trump signed an execu-14
tive order requiring the federal government to obtain consent15
from state and local governments before settling refugees in16
their jurisdictions. In the following months, local governments17
in North Dakota, Minnesota, Virginia, Colorado, and beyond18
voted on whether to consent to refugee resettlement.1 Due to19
legal challenges, the final status of the executive order is uncer-20
tain. However, regardless of outcome, the order highlights the21
importance of local policymakers throughout the resettlement22
process. Furthermore, these developments have global impli-23
cations due to the United States’ prominent position in the24
refugee resettlement ecosystem. Until 2018, the United States25
accepted the most refugees of any country,2 with more than26
500 US cities accepting over 100 refugees from 2002-2018.327
1Field, Andy Tsubasa. “Burleigh County OKs refugee resettlement after passionate testimony.” The
Bismark Tribune December 10, 2019; Kaul, Greta and Tom Nehil. “How every Minnesota county
has voted on refugee resettlement so far.” The Minnesota Post January 16, 2020; Tyree, Elizabeth,
Valencia Jones, and Kaicey Baylor. “Appomattox Co. passes resolution refusing to become refugee
sanctuary.” WSET December 16, 2019; Aguilar, John. “Colorado communities welcome refugee
resettlement.” The Denver Post January 8, 2020.
2Radford, Jynnah and Phillip Connor, “Canada now leads the world in refugee resettlement, sur-
passing the U.S.” Pew Research Center June 19, 2019.
3See the New American Economy Research Fund’s data for details.
This article investigates the attitudes of local elected of- 28
ficials toward refugees, with a focus on how refugee group 29
attributes (e.g., educational attainment, religion, and region of 30
origin) affect officials’ attitudes. While the US Refugee Admis- 31
sions Program’s stated intent is humanitarian, an abundance 32
of scholarship shows that members of the public favor refugees 33
with particular attributes, such as language proficiency and 34
in-group religious identity. We intervene in this literature by 35
providing the first large-scale study of local elected officials’ 36
views on refugee resettlement. To do so, we fielded a conjoint 37
survey experiment asking local elected officials to read pairs 38
of randomly-generated refugee group profiles, and recorded 39
whether respondents were receptive to such groups settling in 40
their communities. This design allows us to build on exist- 41
ing knowledge while generating novel insights into the views 42
of local elected officials, who exert a powerful influence over 43
refugee resettlement outcomes. 44
We find that many local elected officials support refugee 45
resettlement, regardless of refugee characteristics. While sub- 46
stantial variation in preferences exists, approximately half of 47
our respondents supported all refugee group profiles they con- 48
sidered, while approximately one in ten opposed all such pro- 49
files (see also 3). Though local officials in Democratic-voting 50
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counties supported more refugee groups on average, their coun-51
terparts in Republican-voting counties also supported over half52
of the profiles they viewed.53
However, this overall pattern of support conceals important54
attribute-based differences in local officials’ attitudes toward55
refugees. Our experimental evidence shows that officials fa-56
vor refugee groups that are better-educated, possess stronger57
English skills, are predominantly female, and identify as Chris-58
tian. Local officials are also more likely to support refugees59
who are sponsored by a business compared with refugees60
without sponsorship. Descriptive data from an open-ended61
follow-up question suggest that a plurality of respondents focus62
on refugees’ economic contributions, potentially eroding the63
stated humanitarian intent of the US resettlement program.64
Approximately 40% of respondents mentioned refugees’ eco-65
nomic contributions or local resource constraints, compared66
with approximately 25% who mentioned refugees’ social or67
cultural fit.68
Our study encourages researchers to pay closer attention to69
the role of local governments in refugee resettlement. Though70
we caution against re-orienting resettlement policy discus-71
sions toward refugees’ economic contributions or social fit, our72
research provides guidance for both academics and refugee73
resettlement stakeholders.74
2. Policy Context75
A refugee is “any person who is outside any country of such76
person’s nationality [...] and who is unable or unwilling to77
return [...] or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protec-78
tion of that country because of persecution or a well-founded79
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,80
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”481
Refugee resettlement in the United States is a multi-stage,82
multi-level process. Each year, the US government sets a cap83
for refugee admissions. Based on this cap, the UN High Com-84
missioner for Refugees submits cases to the US from a pool of85
approved applicants. Upon referral, potential refugees undergo86
an interview, security clearance, and assignment process. Suc-87
cessful applicants are paired with one of nine non-governmental88
resettlement agencies, which coordinate with federal agencies89
on location selection and services.90
Before 2019, US law required the Department of Health and91
Human Services’ Office of Refugee Resettlement to regularly92
consult state and local governments about the sponsorship93
process and geographic distribution of refugees prior to re-94
settlement.5 Local governments have occasionally used this95
consultation process to voice grievances with resettlement deci-96
sions. For example, after the 2008 Financial Crisis, officials in97
Fort Wayne, Indiana and Manchester, New Jersey requested98
moratoria on refugee resettlement due to funding constraints99
and lack of economic opportunity (4). But formal state or100
local consent was not required for refugee resettlement.101
More recently, local policymakers have assumed new, formal102
powers over refugee resettlement decisions. In September103
2019, President Trump issued an executive order directing104
the Secretaries of State and Health and Human Services to105
create a process for states and localities to provide written106
48 USC §1101(a)(42)(A).
58 USC § 1522(a)(2)(A).
consent for the initial resettlement of refugees.6 Starting July 107
of 2020, the order directed federal agencies to resettle refugees 108
only with the consent of both the state and local governments.7 109
Refugee resettlement agencies sued to block the order,8 which 110
led to a preliminary injunction halting implementation9,10 and 111
a subsequent appeal.11 Nevertheless, more than 111 localities 112
and 41 states gave written consent for refugee resettlement 113
ahead of the injunction.12 Texas was the only state to refuse.13 114
Whether or not the executive order stands, the political 115
debate surrounding the order highlights local officials’ influence 116
over the refugee resettlement process.14 Deliberation and 117
votes on refugee resettlement by local elected officials reflect 118
community priorities.15 When community priorities differ 119
from the legal criteria for refugee admission, empowering local 120
leaders to debate and vote on refugee resettlement could alter 121
refugee resettlement outcomes. 122
3. A Local Government Perspective on Refugees 123
Determinants of Officials’ Receptivity Toward Refugees. In 124
this study we examine local elected officials’ attitudes toward 125
refugee resettlement in their communities. We investigate 126
two broad sets of factors that might lead to greater recep- 127
tivity toward some refugee groups: economic/material and 128
social/cultural factors. While these considerations are not 129
mutually exclusive, and indeed often influence one another, 130
they are useful to distinguish conceptually. 131
Beginning with economic and material considerations, we 132
expect local elected officials to favor refugee groups that can 133
participate in and contribute to the local economy (see, e.g., 134
5–7, for related findings).16 Local officials are particularly at- 135
tuned to budgetary issues and economic constraints in their dis- 136
tricts. We expect signals of employability and self-sufficiency to 137
be especially attractive to resource-conscious officials. Refugee 138
education, business sponsorship, language skills, and status as 139
working-age adults are likely indicators of economic productiv- 140
ity, which should increase officials’ receptivity toward refugee 141
groups with these attributes. 142
6Trump, Donald J. “Executive Order 13888 of September 26, 2019, Enhancing State and Local
Involvement in Refugee Resettlement,” Federal Register 84(190):52355-52356.
7However, the order allows the federal government to override a locality’s decision in order to remain
consistent with other federal laws.
8Rose, Joel. “Advocates Challenge Trump Administration Plan To Let States and Towns Block
Refugees.” NPR November 21, 2019.
9Jordan, Miriam. “Judge Halts Trump Policy That Allows States to Bar Refugees.” The New York
Times January 15, 2020. Monyak, Suzanne. “Md. Judge Says Trump Can’t Let States Refuse
Refugees.” Law360 January 15, 2020.
10The Trump administration has since noted to the Fourth Circuit that the executive order is not a veto
since it provides a “mechanism for the Secretary [of State] to resettle refugees in nonconsenting
jurisdictions.” Dreid, Nadia. “Gov’t Tells 4th Circ. Refugee Order Gives States Input Not Veto.”
Law360 March 25, 2020.
11Kunzelman, Michael. “Feds Appeal Order Blocking Trump Refugee Resettlement Limit.” The Asso-
ciated Press February 12, 2020.
12“Latest Developments on Refugee Resettlement Consent.” Lutheran Immigration and Refugee
Service.
13Monyak, Suzanne. “Texas Is First To Refuse Refugees Under Trump Order.” Law360 January 15,
2020.
14An earlier executive order stated that “state and local jurisdictions [should] be granted a role in
the process of determining the placement or settlement in their jurisdictions of aliens eligible to be
admitted to the United States as refugees.” Trump, Donald J. “Executive Order 13769 of January
27, 2017, Protecting The Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into The United States,” Federal
Register 82(20):8977-8982.
15For example, during public debates on a refugee resettlement consent vote, citizens in Burleigh
County, ND emphasized the need to create a welcoming community for refugees, and worried
about the impact of a negative vote on integration. Field, Andy Tsubasa. “Burleigh County OKs
refugee resettlement after passionate testimony.” The Bismark Tribune December 10, 2019.
16Alternatively, local elected officials may be more skeptical of refugees who may compete for their
constituents’ jobs. However, (8) report that fears of individual-labor competition have a limited
influence over perceptions of potential migrants. We therefore view this possibility as unlikely.




We also expect local elected officials to favor refugee groups143
they view as a sociocultural fit for their communities. Whether144
because of in-group favoritism or out-group animus, existing145
scholarship reports that members of the public favor migrants146
with attributes associated with sociocultural proximity (see,147
e.g. 5–7, 9, 10). In the context of our survey, refugees’ religion,148
religious sponsorship, language, gender/family composition,149
and age affect evaluations of sociocultural fit. Religion, in150
particular, is strongly associated with in-group moral principles151
and identity (11). Since Christianity is the majority religion152
in the United States, we predict that local elected officials153
will favor Christian-identifying refugees and refugees who are154
sponsored by faith-based organizations. Local officials should155
also favor English-speaking refugees, since English is both the156
dominant language and a strong signal of in-group belonging157
to the US. Furthermore, local officials should be more inclined158
to support older and female migrants compared with younger159
male migrants, since residents might associate an influx of160
young, male residents with a higher probability of criminal161
activity (9). This expectation also reflects conventional gender-162
based notions of vulnerability, which advocates and refugee163
resettlement organizations have been known to replicate (12).164
An additional possibility is that local officials may prefer165
refugees originating from some regions compared to others,166
but we do not view this scenario as likely once education,167
language skills, religion, and other demographic attributes are168
taken into account.17169
Lastly, while these economic and social factors imply that170
local officials’ attitudes will depend on refugee group attributes,171
there are also reasons to believe that officials will be indifferent172
to these traits. The legal definition of refugee status is based on173
a well-founded fear of persecution, rather than an individual’s174
ability to contribute materially or assimilate culturally. If175
local officials have internalized this legal designation, then176
they should be receptive overall toward refugees, and their177
level of receptivity should not significantly vary by refugee178
attributes.179
Examining Elected Local Officials. Our theoretical expecta-180
tions draw from a substantial empirical literature on mass—as181
opposed to local official—attitudes toward refugees and immi-182
grants more broadly. While officials clearly share some of their183
constituents’ concerns and attitudes, we should be wary about184
generalizing from the mass public to learn about officials’ atti-185
tudes toward refugee resettlement.18 To be clear, our study186
does not attempt to test hypotheses about whether citizen187
and elite attitudes diverge, which is outside the scope of this188
study. Instead, in this section we outline ex ante why scholars189
and policymakers cannot necessarily generalize from existing190
public opinion scholarship to understand official attitudes.191
First, local government officials represent jurisdictions, and192
rural, sparsely populated jurisdictions are more common than193
more densely populated ones. As a result, the average local194
official’s district is older, whiter, poorer, and has lower educa-195
tional attainment compared to the overall US population.19196
Furthermore, rural communities like those in our sample con-197
tain relatively homogeneous social networks (16), and local198
jurisdictions are more conservative, contain more Christian199
17Members of the American public express little preference for migrants of any specific ethnicity or
national origin (5), though results from Europe are more mixed (contrast 6, 13).
18See (14) as an example of the role of local governments in refugee settlement.
19See CivicPulse Omnibus Survey Reference Guide in SI, and (15)’s Appendix B.
constituents,20 and are more ethnoracially homogeneous than 200
the broader US public (16). Imbalances in political participa- 201
tion also lead to overrepresentation of white, wealthier, more 202
educated, and older voters within these relatively rural and 203
poorer districts (17–20). These demographic and turnout pat- 204
terns likely bias officials’ attitudes toward those of their more 205
politically engaged constituents, and away from a nationally 206
representative sample of residents. 207
Second, owing to their professional responsibilities and ex- 208
periences, local officials may differ systematically from the 209
citizens they represent. Because they manage their govern- 210
ments’ personnel and budgets, local officials are likely to be 211
acutely aware of the resource constraints their communities 212
face. Since rural communities tend to face tight budget con- 213
straints (21), the average local government official might be 214
more sensitive than ordinary citizens to refugees’ impacts on 215
schools, public transportation, and other public goods. In 216
sum, local leaders not only represent a different demographic 217
than the general public, but they are also likely to consider a 218
different set of factors when evaluating refugee policy. 219
Table 1. Demographics of Localities Represented by Sample
Demographics Counties Municipalities & Towns
Population 221,973 38,007
Proportion Urban 48% 72%
2016 GOP Vote Share 59% 52%
Proportion College Educated 24% 29%
# of Gov. Official Respondents 100 474
We contracted with CivicPulse to deploy an online survey 220
experiment to a sample of local government officials in the 221
United States in April 2020. The University of Pennsylvania’s 222
Institutional Review Board determined the survey was eligible 223
for IRB exemption; respondents were recruited through email 224
and volunteered their participation.21 CivicPulse invited a 225
sample of local officials randomly drawn from the population 226
of all US town, municipal, and county elected officials serving 227
populations above 1,000 (see Table 1). Geographically, our 228
574 respondents are divided across 48 states. More than 229
60% serve in municipalities, with the rest split almost equally 230
between townships and counties. The localities represented by 231
officials in our sample are modestly larger, more urban, more 232
educated, and less conservative than the average locality in the 233
United States.22 However, as with the true population of US 234
localities, the average locality represented in our sample is still 235
much less urban, less educated, and more conservative than 236
the population of the United States as a whole. Individual 237
respondents display a similar pattern. Compared with the 238
American public, our sample of local government officials is 239
conservative-leaning with 39% of respondents self-identifying 240
as conservative, 30% as moderate, and 29% as liberal. 66% 241
received at least a college degree and 69% identify as male, 242
with an average of 12 years of experience in government.23 243
20As of 2019, approximately two-thirds of Americans identified as Christian, with higher rates in rural
and suburban communities overrepresented in our sample. See “In U.S., Decline of Christianity
Continues at Rapid Pace.” Pew Research Center October 17, 2019.
21This study qualifies for exemption to human subjects review under 45 CFR 46 101(b)(2). The
University of Pennsylvania’s Human Subject Committee granted exemption on March 30, 2020
(UPenn HSC Protocol #842736). Prior to the receipt of the data, this design was registered with
EGAP (#20200417AC).
22See CivicPulse Omnibus Survey Reference Guide in supplementary materials. CivicPulse also
provided us with the sample means for the 574 conjoint respondents, included in Table 1.
23See Appendix 1 for a full description of survey administration, sampling process, and sample de-





We use a paired conjoint design to identify the causal effects245
of group-level attributes on local elected officials’ receptivity246
toward refugee resettlement.24 Though officials are not pro-247
vided with the demographic characteristics of potential refugee248
groups when voting to allow refugee resettlement, basic infor-249
mation about past and current refugees is publicly available250
and informs public discourse surrounding refugee resettlement251
decisions. As a result, this design presents respondents with252
a hypothetical that closely resembles their real-world deci-253
sions while allowing us to identify key concerns that underlie254
respondents’ preferences.255
Survey respondents first read a short prompt, which in-256
cluded a definition of the term “refugee,” and then viewed two257
randomly generated refugee group profiles, labeled Group A258
and Group B. These profiles consisted of one randomly selected259
value for each of seven theoretically relevant attributes that260
might affect a local government official’s receptivity toward261
refugee group resettlement: education, sponsorship status, lan-262
guage skills, religion, gender/family makeup, age, and region263
of origin. Respondents then indicated whether they were recep-264
tive to either group, Group A only, Group B only, or neither265
group settling in their community. We coded the responses to266
this question as a binary variable—Refugee Group Receptiv-267
ity—which took a value of 1 if a given refugee group profile268
or “either group” was chosen, and 0 for other responses.25 We269
repeated this process two additional times, yielding three total270
paired-conjoint tasks for each respondent.271
Compared with other immigration conjoint surveys (e.g.272
6, 13, 22), our design is parsimonious. We chose this design to273
optimize for our specific target population and policy scenario.274
Since local elected officials are difficult to contact and time-275
constrained, we were limited in both the number of responses276
we could collect and the number of tasks we could ask of each277
individual. And, since we ask respondents to consider groups278
of refugees rather than individuals, including some standard279
conjoint attributes in our experiment would have presented280
respondents with an implausible hypothetical. We discuss our281
specific choices in more detail in Appendix 2, but we chose a282
design that respects respondents’ time and real-world policy283
experience while allowing us to build on existing research.284
5. Results285
Conjoint Findings. Our survey reveals that elected local offi-286
cials generally support a broad range of refugee profiles. Of287
the 534 respondents who answered all three paired-profile288
questions, 51% indicated that they would accept any of the289
six profiles that they were presented with, compared with290
less than 13% who were unwilling to accept any of the six291
profiles. The remaining 36% of respondents varied substan-292
tially, with a roughly even distribution over the remaining293
set of values.26 Given the relatively conservative individual-294
and district-level demographics of our sample, this finding is295
noteworthy, and offers a rejoinder to national-level opposition296
to refugee resettlement.297
mographics.
24See Appendix 2 for question wording, survey delivery, design, and randomization.
25This design also acknowledges the set of preferences respondents are likely to possess. When
asked whether they are receptive to two refugee groups, local elected officials can express opposi-
tion, support regardless of group attribute, or selective support for refugees with certain attributes.
Our design offers all of these options, rather than forcing a relative choice between profiles.
26See Appendix 3 for further details.
Fig. 1. Estimated effects of refugee profile attributes on local leaders’ receptivity
   Sub−Saharan Africa
   Southeast Asia
   Eastern Europe
   Central America
   (Middle East)
Region of origin:
   40 or older
   (39 or younger)
Age:
   Single women
   Family groups
   (Single men)
Group makeup:
   Christian
   Agnostic
   (Muslim)
Religion:
   Fluent English
   Broken but functional English
   (Very little to no English)
Language skills:
   Regional or local business
   Faith−based NGO
   Secular NGO
   (No sponsor)
Sponsored by:
   At least some college
   High school
   Grade school
   (No formal schooling)
Education:
0.0 0.1
Effect on Refugee Receptivity
Dots mark point estimates and lines indicate cluster-robust 95% confi-
dence intervals for the AMCE of each attribute value on the probability
that respondents were receptive to a particular refugee group. The
comparison category’s AMCE is the difference in the probability of re-
ceptivity between that category and the baseline category in parentheses
(observations= 3324; respondents= 574).
Figure 1 reports the effect of each attribute value on the 298
respondent’s probability of being receptive to a refugee group— 299
the average marginal component effect (AMCE).27 Estimates 300
are drawn from a regression model in which Refugee Group 301
Receptivity is regressed on indicator variables for each level of 302
each refugee group attribute, with baseline categories excluded 303
and standard errors clustered by respondent.28 304
We find strong evidence that US local government officials 305
are more receptive to refugees with a greater potential for a 306
positive economic impact. First, local officials are significantly 307
more receptive to potential refugee groups with higher levels 308
of education. Respondents are 7.7 and 8.3 percentage points 309
more likely to support refugee groups with a high school 310
education and at least some college, respectively, compared 311
with refugee groups with no formal schooling. This relationship 312
may suggest that respondents view more educated refugees 313
as more likely contributors to the local economy. Second, 314
local elected officials are 7.9 percentage points more likely 315
to support refugee groups sponsored by a regional or local 316
business compared to refugees with no sponsor, which suggests 317
respondents are likely prioritizing economic integration for 318
refugees. Direct sponsorship from a business group is likely 319
27The average marginal treatment effect of each component is identifiable under a set of assumptions
likely to hold in a typical conjoint experiment (22). In addition, see Appendix 3 for the AMCE results
table and marginal means results.
28All in-text results are based on unweighted models. In Appendix 1, we discuss this choice further.
In Appendix 3, we present an alternative model that includes locality-level demographic weights as
a robustness check.




associated with employment opportunities.29320
We also find evidence that local officials are more likely321
to support refugees they believe will integrate more easily322
into their communities. First, respondents are 9.6 percentage323
points more likely to support Christian refugees settling in324
their communities compared with Muslim refugees, which is325
the single largest effect we identify. While officials prefer326
agnostic refugees to Muslim refugees (3.4 percentage points327
more), this difference is not statistically significant at the .05328
level. This finding suggests that respondents may hold in-329
group preferences for Christian refugees rather than out-group330
animus directed specifically at Muslim refugees, though future331
work should investigate this possibility further.30332
Second, local officials are 4.4 and 8.8 percentage points333
more likely to support refugee groups primarily consisting of334
families and single women, respectively, compared with the335
baseline group of single men. This difference likely results from336
a perception that single men are more likely to participate337
in socially disruptive behavior (see also 9). The support for338
family groups over single men suggests that respondents are339
focused on the societal fit of the group’s composition rather340
than the potential fiscal burden of families alone.31341
Local elected officials are also 5.8 and 4.8 percentage points342
more likely to support refugee groups with fluent or broken343
but functional English skills, compared with a baseline of very344
little to no English. Since officials likely associate refugees’345
English proficiency both with refugees’ sociocultural fit and346
their ability to participate in the local economy, we cannot347
definitively associate this finding with a particular mecha-348
nism. However, officials clearly prefer English speakers to349
non-English-speakers, even when refugees’ English skills are350
imperfect.351
Local officials do not appear to possess a significant pref-352
erence with respect to refugee age or regional origin. The353
null result with respect to age may be due to the age cutoff354
we use in our study. Since adults above or below age 40 can355
plausibly be within prime economic productivity years, if re-356
spondents prioritize refugee economic contributions they may357
be roughly indifferent between these two categories (see, e.g.358
6). By contrast, our null result on regional origin may be due359
to respondent political knowledge. Holding all other attributes360
constant, local officials may not have sufficient information361
about specified regional groupings to express a preference.32362
Open-Ended Responses. We concluded our survey with an363
open-ended question, in which we asked local elected officials to364
identify the most important issues to consider when assessing365
how a group of refugees might settle into their community.366
Out of the 574 respondents who answered at least one conjoint367
question, some 439 (76%) offered at least some response to368
this question. Since open-ended responses are necessarily369
29Business sponsorships are not currently part of the refugee resettlement process in the United
States. However, we included the option in our profile design since other countries, including
Canada, allow for private sponsorship.
30(23) similarly find that Americans favor humanitarian action to save Christian over Muslim victims
of war as a result of in-group preference.
31This finding may also stem from our focus on refugee groups instead of individuals. Respondents
may be particularly wary of groups consisting of largely single men, especially in cases where the
hypothetical group is larger.
32As shown in Appendix 3, as a robustness check, we pooled all non-Middle East regions to compare
whether there is a systematic bias against refugee groups from the Middle East. The difference
between the Middle East and non-Middle East categories is not statistically significant at the .05
level. However, in the weighted version of the analysis presented in Appendix 3, respondents do
show a statistically significant and lower level of support for refugee groups from the Middle East.
unstructured, any analysis of their contents is exploratory 370
by nature. However, examining open-ended responses can 371
reinforce the findings we describe in the previous sections and 372
reveal the logic that underlies them. 373
To summarize our open-ended data, we nonexclusively 374
coded each response based on two sets of categories. The 375
first set consisted of our seven conjoint attributes. The sec- 376
ond set consisted of four abstract categories: Economy, So- 377
cial/Cultural, Immigration Process, and Public Order. These 378
categories represented the four most prominent themes we 379
identified by reading a sample of open-ended responses. All 380
responses were double-coded, with disagreements adjudicated 381
by a third coder.33 382
The marginal histograms in Figure 2 illustrate that respon- 383
dents most frequently identify refugee language skills as a key 384
area of concern, followed by education and sponsorship status. 385
These three attributes reaffirm the set of influential attributes 386
identified in the conjoint portion of the survey. Surprisingly, 387
gender/family group makeup and religion were not frequently 388
mentioned despite their effect in the conjoint portion of the 389
survey. One possible explanation for this divergence is social 390
desirability bias. Though some respondents may be wary of 391
primarily Muslim or male refugee groups, they may be more 392
willing to express this preference in the conjoint portion of the 393
survey than in an open-ended response (24). 394
As implied by their professional responsibilities, local offi- 395
cials most frequently mentioned economic concerns in their 396
open-ended responses (see marginal histograms in Figure 2). 397
Nearly half of all open-ended comments contained language 398
categorized as Economy, while approximately one-third were 399
categorized as Social/Cultural. Since these categories are 400
broad, the specific concerns within most of these categories 401
varied substantially. For example, some 60% of respondents 402
who raised economic concerns cited availability of jobs in 403
their community, while 29% mentioned suitability of housing, 404
transportation, or other physical infrastructure. A smaller 405
number of respondents also referenced language assigned to 406
the Immigration Process and Public Order categories, which 407
suggests that these categories were less central to respondents’ 408
attitudes. 409
Open-ended responses also allow us to explore context 410
for our experimental findings. As the heatmap in Figure 411
2 shows, mentions of education and sponsorship were most 412
highly correlated with our “Economy” category, which suggests 413
that some respondents evaluated these categories primarily 414
through their association with refugees’ perceived economic 415
contributions. By contrast, language skill mentions were not 416
strongly correlated with any of our abstract categories. This 417
finding suggests that language plays a more complex role, 418
which spans respondents’ perceptions of refugee contributions 419
to the local economy, the social/cultural milieu, and public 420
order. 421
Subgroup Analyses. We also examine whether local officials’ 422
refugee receptivity preferences differ by their counties’ parti- 423
sanship, their own levels of interaction with non-Americans, 424
and their localities’ populations.34,35 First, we compare offi- 425
cials by whether their jurisdiction is located in a county that 426
voted for Donald Trump in the 2016 Presidential election. 427
33See Appendix 4 for definitions, examples, intercoder reliability, and per-attribute summary statistics.
34We follow (13, 25) and use marginal means to compare subgroups instead of AMCEs.
35See Appendix 3 for subgroup variables, marginal mean plots, and F-test results for each subgroup.






































Counts of each attribute are shown in marginal histograms. Cell hues
denote correlation between attribute pairs (n = 574). See Appendix 4
for visualizations of attribute counts and co-occurrences.
We observe significant differences—ranging from 7.9 to 22.8428
percentage points—between the two groups of respondents429
on every attribute level, with officials in Republican-voting430
areas exhibiting a lower level of support across all attributes.36431
Officials in Republican-voting counties also expressed stronger432
preferences toward refugee group religion and education. These433
respondents were more than 13 percentage points more likely434
to support Christian refugees compared to Muslim refugees435
36See (26) for parallel evidence of local officials’ individual-level polarized preferences on refugee
resettlement.
and refugees with education at a high school level or above 436
compared to those with no formal education. By comparison, 437
officials in Democratic-voting counties did not significantly 438
discriminate based on refugees’ religious or educational back- 439
grounds. 440
Second, local government officials who interact more fre- 441
quently with non-US citizens are significantly more receptive 442
to all attribute levels than officials who interact infrequently, 443
with per-level differences ranging from 6.7 to 18.3 percentage 444
points. This finding aligns with prior research suggesting per- 445
sonal interaction with immigrants moderates preferences (13). 446
Third, officials in more populous localities express more sup- 447
port for most refugee group attribute levels than officials in less 448
populous localities, though not all differences are significant. 449
6. Implications 450
Our analysis of local government officials’ receptivity toward 451
refugees offers two primary conclusions. First, in line with the 452
stated humanitarian focus of the US Refugee Admissions Pro- 453
gram, we find that many local elected officials are supportive 454
of refugee resettlement regardless of refugee group attributes. 455
Approximately half of all local policymakers favored refugee 456
admission for all profiles viewed, and almost all favored refugee 457
admission for at least some types of refugee groups. This pat- 458
tern is strongest among officials in Democratic-voting counties, 459
but officials in Republican-voting counties still supported over 460
half of all refugee group profiles they viewed. While our study 461
focuses on the attitudes of local officials, future research should 462
connect these results to more qualified patterns of support 463
expressed by members of the general public (see, e.g. 27). 464
One possible explanation for this limited level of attribute- 465
based discrimination is social desirability bias. However, if 466
local officials are concerned with the social acceptability of 467
their answers in an anonymous survey, they are also likely to 468
modulate their positions in public-facing policy discussions. 469
Though the answers to our survey might potentially overesti- 470
mate respondents’ “sincere” support for refugee admissions, 471
they provide a reasonable representation of respondents’ pub- 472
licly expressed beliefs. 473
Second, we find that local policymakers are concerned with 474
refugees’ ability to both fit with local values and participate 475
in the local economy. This pattern is stronger among officials 476
in Republican-voting than Democratic-voting constituencies 477
on at least some attributes, including education and religious 478
background, but is present among both groups. We cannot ad- 479
judicate decisively between respondents’ motives, on average, 480
for preferring refugees with particular attributes. Such prefer- 481
ences could reflect apprehension toward refugees or concern 482
for community capacity to provide refugees with essential re- 483
sources. But, descriptive data from our open-ended follow-up 484
question suggest that officials may be more strongly motivated 485
by refugees’ perceived economic contributions than by refugees’ 486
perceived community fit. This result matches our theoretical 487
expectations regarding the relative importance of economic 488
issues to local elected officials, though future experimental 489
work should further investigate these mechanisms. 490
Local officials are crucial to refugee resettlement, and yet 491
their attitudes have been understudied. Based on our findings, 492
emphasizing business sponsorship programs, skill development, 493
language training,37 and explicit financial support to local 494
37Notably, less than half of all arriving refugees in the United States speak any English (28).




communities likely represent high-impact public engagement495
strategies for refugee resettlement stakeholders seeking to496
bolster refugee acceptance. When federal or state funding for497
these programs is not available, refugee resettlement agencies498
may find less expensive interventions more sustainable, such499
as placing refugees to optimize employment opportunities (29)500
or highlighting how refugees make a positive net fiscal impact501
across levels of government.38502
We emphasize that concerns about economic contribution503
and community fit are neither legal nor normative reasons504
for rejecting refugees, who are eligible for resettlement once505
the United States determines their claim of persecution in506
their home or other country is well-founded. Engagement507
strategies that focus on these factors should not undermine508
the humanitarian purposes of the US refugee resettlement509
program, which is designed to resettle the most vulnerable. We510
do not contest a robust right to apply for refugee status or seek511
asylum in the United States or any other country. However,512
our results do reveal policy-relevant information about the513
attitudes of an understudied and increasingly important group514
of refugee resettlement gatekeepers. Overall, we find that515
officials across the political spectrum are receptive to a broad516
range of refugee groups, which offers a timely rejoinder to517
suspicion toward refugee resettlement prevalent in national518
US politics.519
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